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Which Theory Is Directing China’s Reform of State-Owned 
Enterprises: From 1978 to 2008 and Onward? 
Zheng Li,  Shuanping Dai 
Abstract: China’s reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has achieved notably 
through 30 years of reforms while the performance of SOEs is still low. Basing on a 
summing-up of reforms of SOEs the paper gives an evaluation of economic theories 
affecting China’s reform of SOEs. Focuses in different periods of the reform are 
varied, as are the theories guiding decision-making. This paper, taking the three 
representative arguments of Wu Jinglian vs. Li Yining, Justin, Yifu, Lin vs. Zhang 
Weiying, and Lang Xianping vs. Gu Chujun within the 30 years as a clue, has put in a 
model theories that affect China’s reform of SOEs like market economy theory, 
modern property right theory, modern firm theory, and management of state assets. 
The paper holds that economic theories that are able to guide China’s reforms of 
SOEs should possess at least the two theoretical characteristics: They can build SOEs 
into subjects of socialist market competition macro-economically and they can 
explain and solve the multi-level principal-agent relations of SOEs 
micro-economically. 
I. Introduction 
China’s traditional state-owned enterprises (SOEs) system is connected with the 
highly concentrated planned economy system. Under this kind of system, the 
enterprise is just a workshop in the national economy managed as a large factory 
under the regulation of state instruction plan. The enterprise is essentially a subsidiary 
of the administration authorities, but not an independent commodity producer. The 
enterprise system, which distinguishes from the state administrative authority system 
and is economically independent, in fact does not exist. Nor does the independent 
enterprise property right which relates with market transactions. As a result of these 
malpractices, before the reform and opening-up policy, the SOEs management system 
is rigid, management mechanism stagnant, the enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity of 
both the enterprise and the people seriously oppressed. For this reason reform of the 
SOEs takes mobilizing the enterprise and the people to enthusiasm for production and 
management as the starting point, and moves gradually in depth since the CPC’s 3rd 
session of the 11
th
 central committee. In 1984, "the Central Committee of the CPC’s 
Resolution on Economic System Reforms" explicitly pointed out that, "the socialism 
of Chinese characteristics should first have enterprises gain full vigor. While various 
problems with the present economic system focus exactly on the fact that the 
enterprise lacks the vigor it should have." Since then China's economic reforms have 
always centered on reforms of SOEs. It can be concluded that as the key link to 
China’s economy reforms, the reform and development of SOEs is the most important 
factor affecting the formation and development of China’s socialist market economy, 
as well as the vigor and efficiency of national economy development. And more 
specifically, the reform of SOEs affects the economy structure adjustment, such as 
ownership structure, industrial structure, trade structure and so on. That is because the 
industrial distribution of SOEs is abnormal; the SOEs almost take part in all sectors of 
national economy before the reform. 
 
Since the CPC’s 3rd session of the 11th central committee China’s gradual type 
of reforms have advanced from "testing each step before taking it" and have, during 
the 30 years, formed a reform and development path of Chinese characteristics, with 
the richness, the originality and the profound historical significance increasingly 
attracting people’s attention. "China’s pattern", "China’s experience", "China’s path" 
is vividly portrayed. As SOEs reform is the core and central constituent of China’s 
gradual type reforms, it is indispensable to the success or failure of the gradual reform. 
This paper attempts to help people understand the logic of China’s gradual type 
reforms from an angle of SOEs reform. It first reviews and summarizes the four 
stages of China’s SOEs reforms of the 30 years and its achievements; then it 
comments on three influential theoretical arguments in the history of China’s SOEs 
reforms, and summarizes and explains the inter-relations between SOEs reforms and 
the socialist market progression reflected by the arguments. As to the core content of 
the 30 years reforms of SOEs, it mainly centers on the management of maintaining 
and increasing state asset value and the entrustment to manage, as well as 
responsibility, authority and benefit related to management and entrustment. So 
viewed in depth the problem of SOEs reform is a two-way, multi-level principal-agent 
problem and the paper gives a particular research in the fourth part. As the conclusion, 
the fifth part summarizes and forecasts main research conclusions of the paper and 
main theory difficulties affecting China’s SOEs reforms.  
II. The 4 stages and their effects of China's SOEs 
reform 
Regarding the stage of China’s SOEs reforms, there are different ways to divide. 
Some scholars proposed two-stage theory (Liu, Zhongli, 2000), namely to divide the 
SOEs from the shallower to the deeper into stage of authority quit and benefit 
concession and stage of institution innovation. Some scholars proposed three-stage 
theory (Wang, Haibo, 2005; Liu, Hanmin, 2007), like expansion of autonomous right 
(1979-1984), separation of ownership and management (1985-1992) and 
establishment of modern enterprise institution (since 1993). Many other scholars 
propose four stage theory, but different in specific names and time spans. This paper, 
basing on the progression of China’s SOEs reform from the shallower to the deeper, 
divides into four stages of "authority quit and profit concession" (1978-1985), 
"transformation of management mechanism" (1986-1992), "innovation of enterprise 
system" (1993-1996) and "adjustment of economic structure" (since 1997).  
1. stage of authority quit and profit concession: expanding enterprise’s 
autonomous rights of operations and increasing profit portion of SOEs. 
In view of the problem that the government controlled the enterprise so 
excessively under planned economy system and caused the enterprise to lack the vigor, 
the SOEs reform started first from quitting authority and conceding benefit. In 
December 1978, the 3rd session of the 11th central committee of CPC pointed out that, 
"(authority) should be released under leadership boldly to let local and industrial and 
agricultural enterprises have more autonomous right to management under unified 
state plan instruction", to change "the concentration of authority" phenomenon. In 
May 1979, the central government decided to have 8 SOEs, Capital Steel Corporation, 
Shanghai Diesel Engine Works and others as pilots of the country. In July of the same 
year, the State Council issued "Regulations on the Expansion of the Autonomous 
Right to Management of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises", "Regulations on Profit 
Retain of SOEs" and other documents. Hereafter release of authority and profit 
concession reforms started very quickly nationwide. In September 1981, the state 
started economic responsibility system against SOEs and established enterprise 
internal economic responsibility system to clarify the relations between authority, 
responsibility and right of the state, the enterprise, and the workers, and through 
combining them together made the enterprise gradually become the relatively 
independent economic entity. In April 1983, the state started to carry out the reform of 
tax-levying instead of profit-sharing for SOEs, namely the SOEs should pay taxes 
instead of turning in profits as it originally did, thus intensifying the enterprise’s 
budget constraint and increasing its motivation. In May 1984, the State Council issued 
"Temporary Regulations on the Further Expansion of State-Owned Industrial 
Enterprise’s Autonomous Right to Management", stipulating 10 autonomous rights to 
production management, product sales, pricing and other aspects. In September 1985, 
the State Council approved in extension "Temporary Regulations on Strengthening 
the Vitality of Large- and Medium-Sized State-Owned Industrial Enterprises" drafted 
by the State Economic Commission and the State Commission for Restructuring 
Economy, which has made 14 stipulations to continued to expand the enterprise’s 
autonomous rights. 
 
The reform of "authority quit and profit concession" with the characteristic of 
interests re-adjustment has stridden across the traditional enterprise management 
system historically and has motivated both the enterprise and its workers in certain 
degree. But the old relational pattern between the state and the enterprise remained 
unchanged, and the enterprise was still in a status of subsidiary to the government 
administrative sections. In addition, the central government failed to implement 
effectively the authorities given to the enterprise, plus the soft budget restraint of the 
enterprise. The manager lacked enough accumulative motivation and thus it was very 
difficult for the reform to continue. 
2. Stage of transformation of enterprise management mechanism basing on the 
theory of separation of ownership and management 
In October 1984 the CPC’s 3 session of the 12th central committee established 
the goal for SOEs reforms as: The enterprise should actually become a relatively 
independent economic entity, a socialist commodity producer and operator who can 
make its own management decisions and take full responsibility for its own profits 
and losses, should have the ability of self-remolding and self-development, and 
should become the legal person having certain rights and responsibilities. Focusing on 
this reform goal, in April 1987, the central government decided to carry out contract 
institution nationwide and till year end 1988, nationally 95% of large- and 
medium-sized SOEs had implemented the first round of contracting, and by year end 
1991, the enterprise whose contract expired in the first round transformed to the 
second round. The contract management responsibility system attempts, on the basis 
of persistence to public ownership, to separate property rights from managerial rights 
so as to separate government functions from enterprise management and thus 
distinguishing rights and liabilities. The contract system did play the role of 
mobilizing the enterprise to complete the profit goal in certain period, but the effect 
was extremely limited. The contract institution caused most enterprise managers to 
pursue for the maximization of short-term income in the contracted period but to 
neglect the enterprise's long-term development, and many enterprises appeared "to be 
contracted when at profit but not at loss", and "contacted but not to bankrupt". 
3. Stage of innovation of enterprise institution centering on establishing modern 
enterprise institution  
In October 1992, the CPC’s 14th National Congress explicitly proposed that the 
goal of China’s economic restructuring was to establish socialist market economy 
system. In November 1993, the 3
rd
 session of the 14
th
 CPC central committee passed 
"Decisions of the CPC Central Committee on Problems Concerning the Establishment 
of Socialist Market Economy System", proposing that the goal of SOEs reform was to 
establish modern enterprise institution, and summarizing the modern enterprise 
institution characteristics into "clearly established ownership, well defined power and 
responsibility, separation of enterprise from administration, and scientific 
management". In December of the same year, the National People's Congress passed 
"Corporation Law of People's Republic of China". At the beginning of 1994 the State 
Council requested to carry out pilot project on the establishment of modern enterprise 
institution according to "Corporation Law", in order to disseminate in full scale after 
obtaining the experience. Since 1995 pilot projects authorized by the State Council 
started to work all around. Also in this year, the policy "to focus on the restructuring 
of major enterprises and relax control over minor ones", namely "to invigorate large 
while leave small" was proposed and started to implement. Basing on the plot projects, 
the work to establish modern enterprise institution was launched nationwide. Ever 
since establishing modern enterprise institution has gradually become the basic 
direction of China’s SOEs reform. The core of establishing modern enterprise 
institution is to reform the property right system of sate-owned enterprises and build 
clearly defined and reasonable enterprise property right relations. Its main contents 
are: consummate enterprise legal person system, strict limited liability system, and 
sound corporation governance. 
 
The difficulty and the key link for SOEs to establish modern enterprise institution 
is to build effective corporation governance. And it continues to be so until now. In 
1999, CPC’s 4th session of 15th central committee adopted "Decisions of the CPC 
Central Committee on Reform and Development of SOEs Concerning Certain Major 
Issues", which for the first time proposed in official documents "corporation 
governance" concept, and which proposed "to clearly define the responsibility of the 
shareholder meeting, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and managers, so 
as to form corporate legal person governing structure with each party responsible for 
its duty, under coordinated operations and effective check and balance". In 2002 the 
CPC’s 16th national congress reports again explicitly proposed that "state-owned 
large- and medium-sized enterprises continue to implement the standardized corporate 
system reform to perfect legal person governing structure". In 2003 the state-owned 
assets supervision and administration institution was established to effectively fulfill 
the investor’s responsibility, and to deepen the state assets management system 
reform. 
 
Generally speaking, until 1996 China’s SOEs reform didn’t obtain the results it 
should have. The amount of loss of SOEs increased, and portion grew (to see Table 1), 
even with net loss as the amount of loss for unprofitable enterprises surpassed the 
earning of profitable enterprises, and the number of industries entirely at loss also was 
increasing. In addition to that, there were more and more workers from SOEs to be 
laid off or unemployed, with income reduced and life in difficulty. The condition of 
SOEs has got attention and worry from both the government and the public.  
 
Table 1 Increase of Loss of SOEs (1978-1996) 
Year  
Amount of loss 
（billion RMB） 
Portion of unprofitable 
enterprises（%） 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
4.2 
3.6 
3.4 
4.6 
4.8 
3.2 
2.7 
3.2 
5.4 
6.1 
8.2 
18.0 
34.9 
36.7 
36.9 
—— 
—— 
22.9 
20.8 
12.8 
10.2 
  10.2 
9.6 
13.1 
13.0 
10.9 
16.0 
27.6 
25.8 
23.4 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
45.2 
48.3 
54.1 
69.0 
30.3 
33.0 
—— 
37.5 
Sources: China Statistics Yearbook (1996); China Daily, 4/22/1997. 
4. Stage of system innovation focusing on state economy restructuring 
After CPC’s 15th national congress the thinking for SOEs reform had new 
development, and the indicator is to readjust the strategic layout of state-owned sector 
of the economy according to its status and choose the way to reform SOEs. As early 
as September 1995 the CPC’s 5th session of 14th central committee explicitly proposed 
in "Long Term Program for 9
th
 Five-Year Plan and 2010" that SOEs should be 
strategically restructured so as to invigorate the entire state economy. The CPC’s 15th 
national congress reports further expounded this guiding ideology, pointing out that 
"the SOEs reform should be connected with reorganization, transformation, and 
management enforcement; it must focus on the entire state economy to implement the 
strategic reorganization of SOEs;  large enterprises should be revitalized while small 
ones be set free". The 4th session of CPC’s 15th central committee pointed out more 
explicitly in "Decisions on Reform and Development of SOEs Concerning Certain 
Major Issues" that "the strategic adjustment of the layout of state economy should be 
connected with optimizing and upgrading industrial structure and with adjusting and 
consummating ownership structure." The CPC’s 16th national congress report further 
emphasized "continuing to adjust the layout and the structure of state economy and 
reforming state assets administration system are the significant duty to further 
economic system restructuring." CPC’s 17th national congress report proposed 
"furthering the corporate joint stock system reform of SOEs, perfecting modern 
enterprise institution, optimizing layout and structure of state economy, and 
enhancing the vigor, control power, and influence of state economy". Obviously, 
adjustment of state economy structure and establishment of modern enterprise 
institution have become the basic direction for SOEs reform. 
 
 Since the CPC’s 15th national congress proposed strategically adjusting the layout 
of state economy in 1997, there has been substantive progress after 10 years’ efforts. 
State- owned economy and state-owned assets have gradually concentrated in 
important industries and key fields of national economy lifelines, and in big 
enterprises, gradually withdrawing from common competitive industries. The 
condition of large amount of SOEs dispersing in many fields started to change. As 
shown in Table 2, in 1998 there were 238,000 state-owned industrial and commercial 
enterprises; but in 2006 the number was reduced by half to 119,000. In 1997 the 
profits of state-owned industrial and commercial enterprises were 80 billion RMB 
Yuan; but in 2006 the profits reached 1200 billion RMB Yuan, 14 times’ growth. In 
2000 the net assets of state-owned industrial and commercial enterprises reached 
5755.44 billion RMB Yuan, with central enterprises’ net assets 3069 billion RMB 
Yuan. In 2006 net assets of central enterprises grew to 5390 billion RMB Yuan, with 
profits 768.15 billion RMB Yuan, and tax delivery 682.25 billion RMB Yuan. Also in 
2006 the number of central enterprises whose sales income had surpassed 100 billion 
RMB Yuan was 21, and profits surpassing 10 billion RMB Yuan was13. 
 
Table 2 Economic Indicators of Reform and Development of China’s State-Owned Industrial and 
Commercial Enterprises 1998--2006  
year 
indicators 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
No. of SOEs 
(10,000) 
23.8 21.7 19.1 17.4 15.9 14.6 13.6 12.6 11.9 
Total assets 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
134780 145288 160068 179245 180219 199971 215602 242560 290000 
Net assets 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
50371 53813 57976 61436 66543 70991 76763 87387  
Sales income 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
64685 69137 75082 76356 85326 100161 120722 140727 162000 
Total profits 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
800 
(1997) 
    4852 7364 9190 12000 
Sales profit 
ratio（%） 
0.3 1.7 3.8 3.7 4.4 4.5 6.1 6.5 7.4 
Tax delivery 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
     8140  10075 14000 
No. of workers 
(10,000) 
6394 5998 5564 5017 4446 3067 3660 3209  
No. of central 
firms 
     196   157 
Total assets of 
central firms 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
     83280   122000 
Net assets of 
central firms 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
     36000   53900 
Total profits of 
central firms 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
     3006   7681.5 
Tax delivery of      3563   6822.5 
central firms 
(0.1 billion 
RMB) 
The above four stages of SOEs reform reflects the gradual, shallow-to-deep 
progression of China’s SOEs reforms and its path dependence. The SOEs reforms 
started from rebuilding and adjusting internal interest relations basing on combining 
two powers, then moved to transform the enterprise operating mechanism on the basis 
of separation of two powers, then innovated enterprise system on the foundation of 
re-defining property right, and finally restructured ownership basing on repositioning 
the function of state-owned economy and SOEs. Expanding enterprise autonomous 
right in 1978 as a "minor historical event" has bound the SOEs in the track of property 
right reform and market progression. Due to the fetter of the old economic system, 
limitation of people's cognitive capacity and the restriction of the original political 
legal system, the reform strategy of history seems at most second best today. However 
in the end it can lead SOEs stably to the proper way and this is irreversible. 
Ⅲ Three debates in Chinese SOEs reform history and 
their academic meanings 
Chinese SOEs reform lasts for 30 years filled with so many debates. In this period, 
many economic characters and theories have emerged, such as “the marketization 
theory” raised by Wu Jinglian who is called “market Wu”, “the stock theory” raised 
by Li Yining who is called “stock Li”. “The property right theory” raised by Zhang 
Weiying, “the fair competition environment theory” raised by Justin, Yifu, Lin and so 
on. The theories led and promoted the above reform practically, at the same time, 
examined by the above reform. In the process of the interaction between theories and 
in the practices, there are three famous academic arguments outstandingly reflect the 
mainstream theories’ thinking in the Chinese SOEs reform, thus worth paying much 
attention. 
Debates between “Market Wu” and “Stock Li” 
In the beginning, the argument about how to impel the reform mainly divided into 
two parts, took Wu Jinglian and Li Yining as representative respectively, it was called 
“Debates between Wu and Li”. Wu Jinglian thought that the reason why SOEs 
practiced low efficiency lies in the insufficient growth of the market and lacks of the 
necessary market price mechanism. In order to reverse this negative situation, price 
reform should be carried on firstly. Li Yining and some other economists raised the 
opinion that the reason why showed a low efficiency was that SOEs hadn’t been taken 
as an independent individual in the market. Only if the enterprises pursue the profit 
maximization and the SOEs become an independent enterprise genuinely, the SOEs 
could achieve overall efficiency enhancement. 
 
Zhou Shulian, Wu Jinglian, Wang Haibo (1981) thought the way to improve the 
system of the whole people's ownership was to carry on the system reform. System 
reform should both maintain the state ownership and make the enterprise become the 
relatively independent management body. The current reform must be carried on 
according to the adjustment and improve the adjustment. In the current situation, the 
ownership could not be reformed radically, so we must pay attention to fully display 
the potential of the state-owned economy. Wu Jinglian (1992) pointed out once again 
that only the market relations—price fluctuation and the benefit changed by it could 
guide the enterprise to make decisions that ensured the social resource effective use. 
Li Yining (1986) thought that the SOEs reform was the key to establish the market 
economy in China. China must put reform on the traditional system of the whole 
people’s ownership and the traditional collective ownership; adjust the ownership 
which did not suit the socialism commodity economy development. In a part of the 
whole people owned enterprises (generally large and medium-sized Enterprises in 
their industries), we might make the stock system of ownership substitute for the 
traditional whole people ownership, and then formed the joint  pattern ownership 
composed by the country, the enterprise and the workers. This procedure could not 
change the nature of the ownership in the socialist system, but it aimed at the 
establishment of new enterprises with the stock system of ownership.  
 
“Debates between Wu and Li” is the confrontation of Chinese reform mentality. 
Actually they argued on the sequence of the two aspects of the same question, 
essentially the argument is the exploration of the way of Chinese economic reform. 
Chinese SOEs reform has enforced gradually in this kind of argument. Practically, the 
reform in the premise of following the market economy has enforced the stock system 
transformation in a suitable opportunity, thus has accelerated the establishment of 
Chinese market economy system. Justin, Yifu, Lin, Shen Minggao (1992) raised a 
viewpoint that may give the above argument a good summary, they believed that from 
the aspect of institution design, the joint stock system as if had possessed the function 
that stimulated the state-operated large and medium-sized enterprises, and it was a 
pattern of independent enterprise organization of commodity producer's. But if we 
took a look at joint stock system's external condition, the external environment and 
the system foundation of the reform was actually far from the Western joint stock 
system innovation and macroscopic system environment. Chinese market mechanism 
was imperfect, so the effect of the joint stock system reform would be difficulty to 
totally display. However, if we waited for all conditions to be satisfied, SOEs reform 
would be lagged seriously. That contradictory displayed the focal point of “Debates 
between Wu and Li”, simultaneously, also reflected what impede that kind of 
spanning type reform of China essentially. 
“Debates between Lin and Zhang” 
At the beginning of the SOEs reform, especially when the joint stock system reform 
took place, the problems we faced was still prominent. Justin, Yifu, Lin (1998, 1999, 
and 2003) believed that because of the lack of a perfect market system, transplanting 
such a kind of “the modern enterprise system” was not the most crucial thing, the 
really important thing was to create a fair competition condition and environment, 
thus the budget would be restraint by it. Without a healthy competitive market 
environment, there wouldn’t be serials of targets that simply and intuitively reflected 
the enterprise management, therefore the owner would be unable to supervise the 
management of the enterprise, the problems between enterprise and operator's that 
different aims, asymmetry information as well as the unequal responsibility would be 
hard to handle with. Zhang Weiying (1995b,1996) thought that the incomplete 
enterprise system was the main reason of the inefficiency of the SOEs, and that 
problem would be hardly solved under the system of the government-owned property, 
the only way out was to transfer “state-owned” enterprises to “non-state-owned” 
enterprises. It was impossible to raise and select the qualified entrepreneur community 
under system of the SOEs .The state-owned stockholder's rights must transform into 
creditor's rights or use other methods to realize the withdrawal of the state-owned 
stockholder's rights, making the state-owned business become the non-State-owned 
business. 
 
Along with the SOEs reform's advancement, the conditions of this argument 
actually didn’t exist. The state-owned business withdrew from the general competition 
industry. A huge tide “the state withdraws and the private promote” has rolled up the 
past ten year of the SOEs reform, under such background, the third argument 
emerged. 
“Debates between Lang and Gu” 
The third argument was actually a debate between Lang Xianping and the Chinese 
mainstream economist. In August, 2004, Lang Xianping took Gu Chujun and other 
entrepreneur's management buy-out (MBO)as an analyst case, raised his opinions that 
a large quantity of the state asset had been out- flown and the staff benefit had been 
violated in the SOEs property right reform, he thought the reform was on a wrong 
direction. The main reason of some SOEs's inefficiency did not lay in the unclear 
property right either the owner vacancy or the unfair competition of the market; it lay 
in the lack of the trust responsibility of the SOEs operator and the lack of the 
professional manager market. Lang Xianping's opinion brought numerously 
opposition of Chinese economist immediately who supported MBO and the SOEs 
privatization. The focal points of both sides lie on processing the pattern of MBO or 
not, as well as other SOEs reform methods similar to the MBO form. The 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission made a statement at 
the end of September in the same year that “the implementation of management 
purchases and controlling stock is not suitable with the goal of establishing the 
modern enterprise system and the direction of joint stock system reform”. It supported 
Lang Xianping's viewpoint to a certain extent, hereafter, when comes to the method of 
the SOEs reform, the decision-making strata and the academic circle starts to have 
reconsiderations. 
 
Three debates have further reflected that Chinese SOEs reform was an evolutionary 
and continual process, following the socialist market economy system's 
consummation of China. At the same time, it also reflected constraints such as the 
SOEs reform's external environment, market competition main body and reform way, 
also their interaction. In fact, unintentionally, Chinese SOEs reform was processing 
precisely in the serials of “marketization (displays the function of market mechanism) 
—  the market competition main body mold of the state-owned and the 
non-state-owned — creation fair competition environment —reasonable reform way 
(people may accept and withstand)” . These theories mostly weren’t 
correct-or-incorrect issues. Because of different historic condition and reform process, 
the emphasized point and the limitation was different from each other. But they were 
also not the supreme panaceas of SOEs reform, unable to solve the difficulty of the 
reform fundamentally all by itself. Especially in the relations between market 
environment and SOEs property right, the former is the latter's external condition, and 
the latter provides the power for the former. In other words, unceasingly enhancing 
the marketability degree provides the fine market environment for the SOEs reform, 
the SOEs reform advancement also unceasingly strengthen the marketability level. 
Without a suitable market environment, its difficulty to achieve the goal of SOEs 
reform; similarly, many policies of the state enterprise reform raised the marketability 
level through changing the market microscopic structure. In fact, Chinese 
non-state-owned business' excellent performance together with the state-owned 
business’ getting better and better shows that the market environment construction, 
the market competition main body mold and the state enterprise reform deepen  
interact with each other and win the result altogether. 
Ⅳ Bilateral Principal-agent model and the effective 
explanation of Chinese SOEs 
Although the reform of Chinese SOEs in different period is lead by different 
theory, from the view of overall evolutional process, the most effective explanation is 
multi-layer or bilateral Principal-agent model. In an anther word, the process of the 
evolution of SOEs is a process of the chain of principal-agent being defined 
specifically; it is also the process of that the economic relationship between principal 
and agent is adjusted and competed. This happened in the beginning of reform, and it 
is still existed when the reform developed to the system innovation, whose core is to 
form the modern enterprise system and effective corporate governance structures. If it 
is not solved, we can not do anything effectively. So the degree of it is resolved is the 
real progress in the reform of SOEs. 
 
The public nature of the SOEs doomed that the ultimate owners of corporate 
(principal) can not operate the asset directly. Companies only can be managed by 
specific government officials or their appointed agents. Therefore, it is a natural and 
appropriate analysis method that put SOEs the framework of principal-agent model. 
Research results from the domestic perspective, the principal-agent problem of SOEs 
are focus on the most general of the agency relationship: government is the principal; 
the manager of SOEs is the agent. 
 
If the manager of the firm (agent) can choose action set is A , special action Aa . 
Agent’s and firm’s benefits are affected by white noise . ),0(~ 2 N .Agent action 
can bring benefit to the enterprise )( ，afR  , of course, the action will bring the 
cost )(acc  to the agent at the same time.  
 
The revenue to the agent can be divided into two parts: fixed income s and shared 
pay ),( eafd  , d is the share ratio (without tax factors).so the revenue function of 
agent is: )(),( acsafdRA   .Accordingly, the revenue function of principal is 
sRdRP  )1( . 
 
According their revenue function, the total benefits PA RR   is not equal to the real 
benefit R，the difference can be interpreted precisely by the cost of the agent action. 
So how to stimulate agent is a very important issue in the SOEs. In the traditional 
SOEs, which is lack of vitality and profit, is disregard of the agent's incentive 
problems. In order to change this situation, “authority quit and benefit concession”, 
“the reform of tax-levying instead of profit-sharing” or “contract institution”, 
implemented at the beginning of the SOEs reform, which all gave reward according to 
the operate performance to the manager (agent) gradually. But, it did not completely 
change the passive situation of the overall losses in SOEs. Principal-agent model have 
been successful partly in the reform, the thinking and policy implications described by 
this model provided an important ideas for China's of SOEs reform. 
 
Of course, principal-agent model is not only the simple meaning above. We assume 
that two parties are risk-neutral, to discuss how to design the arrangement to 
maximize two parties’ benefits. That is, in the situations  PA RR max , how to set 
both goals and how to set up incentive programs. 
 
Proposition 1: In the condition of risk-neutral, maximizing the revenue of the 
principal and the agent respectively, and to maximize the common interests of both 
are equivalent. (Prove elided). 
 
Proposition 2: When the agent is risk averse, the level of incentives and degree of 
risk aversion is the inverse relationship: In order to encourage more efforts taken by 
the agent, the effect of the incentive strategy, adopted by the principal, depends on 
level of the agent's risk aversion. Agent risk aversion is the stronger; the incentive 
effects are not more notable. (Prove elided). 
 
Proposition 3: If it is difficult to be observed when agent seeking private interests, 
the more incentive adopted by principal .the more private interests be seek by agent, 
and the firm benefits unchanged or worsened. 
 
Prove: assume that the total revenue for seeking private interests is B , the 
probability of be observed is p . Corresponding penalty is F .In this situation, the 
managers’ revenue functions is shown by this formula: 
        )(),()1m a x ( acpFBsBafdp    
After deduced, we can get )()1)(1(),()1( acBdpafdp    
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,so if d  and ),()( afac  ，  is not 
changed. Then it will push B  up and to keep the equal balance.  
 
In the three propositions, we can expose the reasons of the MBO trap，inner control 
and state-owned asset lost, which limited the SOEs reform and profit improve. Either 
the“authority quit and benefit concession” at the beginning of reform，or contract 
institution, both of them gave the independent right to the manager blindly, but lacked 
of enough supervision. For example, so far as it goes, MBO is a mature model of 
purchasing company, but owning to lacking of enough supervision. So lots of national 
property was emerged by alike Gu Chujun who purchased state owned enterprise. 
Principal-agent theory is a relatively mature theoretical system, it can explain the 
nature of the firm, the operation and management of enterprises very well, and further 
more, principal-agent theory is the basic framework of a lot of modern economic 
theory .Over the past 30 years of China's state owned enterprise reform process, this 
theory played a role in different level and different nature. It is inevitable that some 
economists are lack of understanding actual connotation and the establishment 
conditions of this theory perfectly, led to a lot of serious problems appeared, such as 
unilateral comprehension, deviate from the situation of china and decision-making 
misleading. 
 
  From an opener perspective, the principal-agent theory explained the fact that is not 
directed against the SOEs, agency theory can only explain part of problems existing in 
SOEs. As Justin, Yifu, Lin (1999) saying, the fundamental reason for SOEs ineffective 
supervision and restraint are not the public nature of the enterprise, but owning to 
lacking of performance evaluation standards on firm operation. In the late 1990s, 
especially in recent years, Chinese state owned enterprise reform began to reflect and 
they doubt the policy function of principal-agent theory. To strengthen the 
management of state-owned assets and improve the efficiency of corporate 
governance, reforms gradually extended. Principal-agent theory started phasing out 
study on China's state-owned reform. However, this is not the full negative to the 
principal-agent theory and principal-agent theory is a general theory. China's SOEs 
reform can further explore the deeper meaning of this theory. After all, the 
principal-agent relationship of china’s SOEs is far from being explained very 
perfectly. 
 
Taking an overview of the research and practice of SOEs reform, the 
principal-agent relationship between the owner of the enterprise (Central Committee 
or the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee) and manager 
existed in SOEs was paid more attention generally. In fact, the principal-agent 
relationship of SOEs is not so simple like in the model analysis. For example, Zhang 
Weiying（1995c）divided the relationship into two different kinds of class system. The 
first class system formed in the delegation chain of power between the principal 
(residual claim right) and agent (Central Committee), and its direction is from lower 
to higher. The second class formed in the delegation chain of power between Central 
Committee and inner member of enterprise, and its direction is from higher to lower. 
As we can see, except for residual claim part and the member of the enterprise, the 
others are in bilateral principal-agent relationship. In fact, Zhang Weiying’s research 
was not practiced during the reform. Before 1978, if considered of its operating 
system, the SOEs can not be called the "Enterprise" with truly enterprise attributes, 
but it is the implementation of the country's economic production plans and the 
government's economic policy. After the reform, though many reform measures have 
been trying to reform this situation, so that SOEs have become a true enterprise; up to 
now, many of the problems existed in SOEs are not resolved in essence. The 
contradictions and hidden crisis exist still in the remaining central enterprises and 
state-controlling enterprises, due to the principal-agent problem. How to hackle the 
multi principal-agent relationship in SOEs and to design mechanism are very 
important issues. First, the state, who is the representative of all the people, as the 
owner of the state-owned assets, this is a principal-agent relationship. The people, 
who is the ultimate owner of state-owned assets, how to supervise the state effectively, 
it’s not only a economic problem, but refer to the political institution. Whether the 
National People's Congress as the institution to monitor the usage of the state-owned 
assets, to evaluate SOEs reform, and to ensure the value of state-owned assets 
preserve and increase, it is a need problem to be resolved in the future reform . 
Because judged from the historical evidence, the National People's Congress can’t 
officiate the right very well. Secondly, the Central Committee appointed the general 
manager of SOEs; the researches on this kind of principal-agent relationship can not 
be considered simply from economic interests. Because of the special status of 
general manager, it is very difficult to define the private interests besides the basic 
incomes depend on the principal-agent model. Thirdly, how do the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Committee to manage SOEs correctly is also a problem 
of designing mechanism; How adjust the supervision and management of the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee still needs to research. 
Therefore, the special principal-agent relationship of SOEs still needs major 
breakthroughs in the future reform of SOEs. Principal-agent theory in the reform of 
China's SOEs will remain a dominant position. 
Ⅴ Conclusion 
Through the summary of theories which direct the SOEs reform from macroscopic 
and the microscopic aspects, The paper holds that economic theories that are able to 
guide China’s reforms of SOEs should possess at least the two theoretical 
characteristics: They can build SOEs into subjects of socialist market competition 
macro-economically and they can explain and solve the multi-level principal-agent 
relations of SOEs micro-economically. Generally speaking, Chinese 30-year SOEs 
reform is successful. But inevitably, some deep contradictions have not been thorough 
solved. The quantity of the Chinese State-owned business is already very small; there 
aren’t any conditions for the former reform pattern and methods to take place. The 
main reason of the difficulty on theory and in practice stems from SOEs' attribute. The 
typical SOEs is a legally autonomous entity that operates along commercial lines but 
is owned in whole or in part by a government（Garner 1970）.The rapid spread of this 
hybrid institution in many countries since World WarⅡis documented, as ever 
become a tendency of such firms to expand into international markets. The difficulty 
of the state-owned business' research lies in the hardness to define the aim of 
management of the SOEs (Cyert and March 1963, p. 26), and this is a global problem.  
 
China's SOEs reform has its own characteristics which are different from other 
capitalist countries’ SOEs reform. In China, the modern economic theory generally 
needs to be unified with Chinese concrete national condition in order to play 
effectively. At present, there are still many problems faced by the Chinese SOEs, such 
as, how to display the special function of public nature of the SOEs, how to raise and 
select entrepreneurs or professional managers who are suitable for the Chinese SOEs 
management, how to guarantee the stableness and appreciation of the state asset, they 
are not purely theoretical problems. However, in order to solve these problems, 
Chinese and even economists all over the world should try to seek for a better theory 
frame diligently.  
   
 
 
Reference 
Blair, Margaret, 1995, Ownership and control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for 21 Century, 
Washington: the Brookings Institution. 
Cai Fang, Justin, Yifu, Lin, 2003, Chinese economy, Beijing: Chinese Finance and Economic 
Publishing House [in Chinese]. 
Cyert, R. and J. March, 1963, a Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ. 
Garner, J. F., 1970, Government Enterprise: A Comparative Study, Stevens, London. 
Justin, Yifu, Lin, &  Tan Guofu.,  1999, “Policy Burdens, Accountability and Soft Budget 
Constraint”, American Economic Review, Vol.89, No.2, pp. 
Justin, Yifu, Lin, Cai Fang & Li Zhou, 1998, “Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned 
Enterprises Reform.” American Economic Review, Vol.88. No.2, pp.422-427. 
Justin, Yifu, Lin, Shen Minggao, 1992, “Analyst on the Reform of the Stock System and 
State-operated large and medium-sized Enterprises”, jingji yanjiu(economic research), No.9[In 
Chinese]. 
Li Fuqiang, Li Bin, 2003, “the Model of Principal -agent and analysis of the incentive 
mechanism”, shuliang jingji jishu jingji yanjiu(quantity economy and technical economy research), 
No.9 [In Chinese].  
Li Yining, 1986, the ownership reform and stock enterprise's management, zhongguo gaige(China 
reforms), No.12[In Chinese].  
Liu Zhongli, 2000, laid a foundation--the economy of China in the past 50 years, Beijing: Chinese 
Finance Economy Publishing House [In Chinese]. 
Naughton, Barry, 1992, “Implications of the State Monopoly over Industry and its Relaxation”. 
Modern China, Vol.18, pp.14-41. 
Qian Yingyi, 1995, the Reform of the Chinese Company Management Structure and Financing, 
Masahiko Aoki edits: the company management structure in the transforming period, Beijing: 
Chinese Economy publishing house [In Chinese].  
Ravi Ramamurti, 1987, “Performance Evaluation of State-Owned Enterprises in Theory and 
Practice”, Management Science, Vol.33, No.7, pp.876-893. 
Wu Jinglian, 1992, organizational structure, basic function and constraints of the market economy, 
lilun qianyan(theory front), No.4 [In Chinese]. 
Wu Zengxian, 1997, “How Successful Has State-Owned Enterprises Reform Been in China?” 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.49, No.7, pp.1237-1262. 
Yang Qijing, 2005, the Theory of the Firm in the Entrepreneurial Perspective, Beijing: Renmin 
University of China Publishing house [In Chinese]. 
Zhang Weiying, 1995a, Enterprise's Entrepreneur —Contract Theory, Shanghai: Shanghai 
People's Publishing Agency, San Lian Book Store [In Chinese]. 
——, 1995b, “Evaluates the State-owned Enterprises Reform from the Point of View of Modern 
Enterprise Theory”, jiage yu shichang(the price and the market), No.2[In Chinese]. 
——, 1995c, “The Relationship in the Principal-agent in the State-owned Economy: Theoretical 
Analysis and Policy Meaning”, jingji yanjiu(economic research), No.4[In Chinese]. 
——,1996, “The System of Ownership, the Management Structure and the Principal-agent 
Relationship”, jingji yanjiu(economic research), No.9 [In Chinese]. 
Zhou Shulian, Wu Jinglian, Wang Haibo, 1981, “Several Questions on Socialism System of 
Ownership of the Whole People”, qiusuo(seeking), No.4 [In Chinese].  
 
 
Authors: 
Dr. Zheng Li  
Associate Professor in Economics School of Jilin University, China 
Visiting Scholar in School of Entrepreneurship and business, University of Essex, UK 
Address: 2699 Qianjin Street, Changchun, Jilin provience，China 
E-mail: lizhengjlu@yahoo.com.cn 
   lzheng@jlu.edu.cn 
  
Shuanping Dai  
PhD student in the department of economics of JiLin University, China, 
Address: Department of Economics, School of Economics, Ji Lin University,  
2699 Qian Jin Street, ChangChun City, JiLin Province, China. 
Post Code: 130012 
E-mail: daishuanping@hotmail.com 
